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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic is changing the world
in unprecedented and unpredictable ways. Human
mobility is at the epicenter of that change, as the
greatest facilitator for the spread of the virus. To
study the change in mobility, to evaluate the ef-
ficiency of mobility restriction policies, and to fa-
cilitate a better response to possible future crisis,
we need to properly understand all mobility data
sources at our disposal. Our work is dedicated
to the study of private mobility sources, gathered
and released by large technological companies. This
data is of special interest because, unlike most pub-
lic sources, it is focused on people, not transporta-
tion means. i.e., its unit of measurement is the clos-
est thing to a person in a western society: a phone.
Furthermore, the sample of society they cover is
large and representative. On the other hand, this
sort of data is not directly accessible for anonymity
reasons. Thus, properly interpreting its patterns
demands caution. Aware of that, we set forth to
explore the behavior and inter-relations of private
sources of mobility data in the context of Spain.
This country represents a good experimental setting
because of its large and fast pandemic peak, and
for its implementation of a sustained, generalized
lockdown. We find private mobility sources to be
both correlated and complementary. Using them,
we evaluate the efficiency of implemented policies,
and provide a insights into what new normal means
in Spain.
1 Introduction
COVID-19 has produced an unprecedented change
in mobility [1, 2]. Governments have implemented
restrictive measures to contain the pandemic, fo-
cused on reducing social contacts [3]. This is
a direct effort towards controlling the COVID-19
spread, at a stage where the test and trace strat-
egy is impractical [4]. Mobility restriction mea-
sures range from the closure of schools and large
gatherings, to the complete lockdown of the popula-
tion and economic hibernation. Different countries
have implemented different measures, varying their
severity and duration [5]. Lifting these restrictions
will lead societies to a new normality, which is still
unclear how much will resemble the old normality.
At this point it seems likely that societies will tran-
sition to a new basal mobility structure [6]. One
we need to analyze and understand the sooner the
better.
There are many public sources of mobility data
which can be used to measure the physical distanc-
ing of population during the COVID-19 crisis [7–9].
Unfortunately, most of these sources provide limited
insights, focusing on a movement modality (e.g.,
public transport occupancy, public bike system us-
age, road densities). An alternative to public data
is the data provided by private technological en-
tities, which have access to a high volume of in-
formation through applications installed in mobile
phones [10]. Even though the segment of population
that has these applications installed is not a perfect
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reflection of society (e.g., young segments of soci-
ety are over-represented while elders and kids are
under-represented) it is large enough to provide re-
liable estimations. At the moment, data provided
by private entities represents the most reliable pub-
lic source of information to explore the big picture
from the perspective of people [11]. Such sources of
data include the ones provided by Google, Facebook
and Apple, as described in Section 2.
The main issue when working with private data
sources is the imperfect knowledge regarding its na-
ture. For privacy preserving reasons, raw data is
never provided. Instead, data goes through heavy
pre-processing and anonymization procedures [12].
Additionally, the conditions under which data is col-
lected are not fully transparent either, as baselines
and contextual information are often missing. To
partially overcome these issues, in this work we in-
vestigate the relation between the different private
data sources, and how can they be used complemen-
tary to provide a better understanding of mobility.
For our analysis, we focus on the case of Spain.
The COVID-19 pandemics in Spain, and the po-
litical measures taken to control its spread in the
country, provide an appropriate experimental setup.
Spain implemented a complete and sudden lock-
down on March 15, 2020, while the first mild re-
strictions were put in place less than a week be-
fore (progressive closure of schools and banning of
large gatherings) [5]. After the pandemic peaked in
April, Spain gradually recovered mobility and ser-
vices over the span of two months (May and June).
We will study Spain’s demographics and consider
the relation between restriction policies, social be-
havior and pandemic evolution. This could be help-
ful for reacting to future mobility crisis. We will
also study its progression towards a new normal-
ity in comparison with the old one. This could be
helpful for the adaptation of mobility policies to the
new social setting.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
First, we describe the data used in this work in
§2. Then we review the social context of the study
in §3, including both the timeline of implemented
policies, and an overview of Spain demographics.
Most of our analysis takes place in §4. This in-
cludes a general study of mobility trends for all re-
gions and data sources (§4.1), a discussion on the
anomalies observed (§4.2), an analysis on the daily
trends (§4.3) and some insights on the new normal-
ity (§4.4). Finally, we review our conclusions in §5.
2 Data Sources
For this work we have considered the data published
by the Facebook Data for Good program (FDG)
[13], by the Google mobility assessments [14], and
by Apple [15]. At the time of our analysis Ap-
ple only provided one single mobility metric, the
number of direction requests made from the Apple
Maps application. In practice, this measure was
too different from the other sources as to be di-
rectly compared. Also, while it was possible to as-
sess the anonymization effect on the data for FDG
and Google, we have not been able to do the same
for Apple. For these reasons, we disregard Apple
data in this analysis.
Private mobility indices are typically provided at
a certain level of aggregated granularity. With ad-
ministrative level 1 being country, level 2 in Spain
corresponds to region (17 Autonomous Communi-
ties or CC.AA.), and level 3 to province (50 of them
in Spain). As we will see next, the Google data is
provided at level 2 (regions), while Facebook data is
provided at level 3 (province), a smaller geograph-
ical granularity. This will be aggregated to level 2
on our work.
2.1 Facebook Data for Good
Facebook Data for Good presents multiple data sets
of mobility, all of them with a general description
of how they are obtained. There are two main
data sets of particular relevance for the purpose of
this work: a remain-in-tile index and movement-
between-tiles index [16]. Both are based on GPS
data from a sample of users that have activated
the tracking system on their mobile phones, divid-
ing the space in level 16 tiles (squares of roughly
500 × 500 m). The first one, remain-in-tile, pro-
vides the percentage of people that remains in the
same tile, computed as the total ratio of mobiles
providing signal which do not change of tile during
a whole day. The second one, movement between
tiles, estimates mobility by computing how many
different tiles are visited by the sample of people,
compared with the same number during the same
day of the week previous to the pandemics (Febru-
ary 2020) [12].
For the rest of this work, we will use the remain-
in-tile index, as it provides a more pure measure-
ment. Notice the remain-in-tile is an absolute mea-
sure (e.g., it does not depend on a baseline). This
makes it straightforward to interpret, and a good
candidate for counting people who are following
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confinement, as long as the population who has ac-
cepted to be pinned represents a good sample of
the population. The anonymization of data pre-
vents us from evaluating the fit between the data
sample and the overall population distribution. A
certain amount of bias is to be expected, as the
penetration of smartphone and Facebook varies sig-
nificantly among cohorts. As with Google, the el-
der population and the younger population could be
slightly underrepresented, which may entail a cer-
tain bias. Nonetheless, the size of the sample lead
us to believe that the data can provide a reliable
picture.
We assess Facebook’s sample size in two ways.
First, by considering Facebook market penetration
in the smartphone market, which is around 50-60%
[17] with smartphones being available for 70% of
the population. The subsample with an activated
tracking system only needs to be around 10% to
have a sample of 4% of the total population. Even
1% of the population would be a very large sample
in any kind of poll. Second, data of active Facebook
users is also available from Facebook geoinsights
maps and indicates that 1% is indeed the typical
order of magnitude of the sample. The fact that
Facebook requires a minimum of 300 active users
to provide data (for anonymity reasons) allows us
to validate the size of the sample. For example, the
province of Spain with the smallest population is
Soria, with roughly 90,000 people. This province
and has never pined less than 300 people for the
whole period under study (i.e., there is data for So-
ria for all days). This means that the sample in
Soria is always above 0.5% of the population. We
have no reason to suspect a lower coverage on the
other provinces of Spain.
Facebook data is provided at level 3 (province)
granularity. In order to compare with Google data
(which is only available at level 2), we need to ag-
gregate it. Any level 2 region is a sum of one or
more level 3 provinces. To compute the level 2 data
from level 3 values we use the average of provinces
weighted by their population. By doing so we ob-
tain the ratio of people that remain in tile at level
2 aggregation for Facebook.
2.2 Google
On April 2, 2020, Google released its COVID-19
Community Mobility Reports [14]. Since then,
Google periodically releases anonymyzed mobility
data 1, organized in a set of categories (e.g., re-
tail, recreation, groceries, pharmacies, parks, tran-
sit stations). This data is always provided at ad-
ministrative level 2 granularity (region). In addi-
tion to those, Google also releases a Residential and
a Workplace measure, estimating how much time is
spent at those places. In the case of Residential, it
is based on the average number of hours spent at
the place of residence for each user within a geo-
graphic location. This data is collected from those
users opting in to Location History, and is processed
using the same algorithms used for the detection of
user location in Google Places, offering an accuracy
of around 100m in urban areas [18]. Google Mobil-
ity Reports releases relative information for every
day of the week. That is, mobility with respect to
a baseline: the first five weeks of the year, from
January 3 to February 6.
Given the large number of users of Google Maps
there is no doubt that the sample size of Google is
also large compared with any standard polling sam-
ple. However, the fact that Google does not provide
an absolute value in the way Facebook does presents
researchers with serious challenges. The most im-
portant is that the baseline can be indeed corrupted
by local festivities or changes in the normal baseline
due to large-scale celebrations. As we will see, lack
of access to the baseline prevents the direct compar-
isons of regions, and even days, and can complicate
its interpretaion.
Google’s residential index, which indicates the es-
timated time spent at the residence, should strongly
correlate with Facebook’s remain-in-tile. i.e., a
large fraction of people remaining at home should
increase both indices. Their direct comparison
should provide context for their interpretation, and
insights on their applicability.
3 Social Context
The first cases COVID-19 in Spain were reported on
January 31st, in the Canary Islands. For roughly a
month, all detected cases were imported from other
countries. The first cases of community transmis-
sion (i.e., source of contagion unknown) were di-
agnosed on the February 26. In March is where
the scope of our analysis begins. The number cases
reached 999 on the 9th. At this point a few sev-
eral regional governments took the first generalized
measures, with the closure of schools. This esca-
lated until March 14, when the Spanish govern-
1http://google.com/covid19/mobility
3
Region Pop. density Population >50k inhabitants Attack rate / 105 inh
Andaluc´ıa 96 8,446,561 50.82 200
Arago´n 28 1,324,397 55.19 533
Asturias 96 1,019,993 60.75 238
Canarias 298 2,220,270 54.26 114
Cantabria 109 581,949 38.55 405
Castilla y Leo´n 26 2,402,877 44.03 1,110
Castilla-La Mancha 26 2,038,440 27.40 1,102
Catalunya 237 7,609,499 53.90 762
Comunitat Valenciana 215 4,998,711 45.50 300
Euskadi 302 2,181,919 46.53 672
Extremadura 26 1,062,797 28.66 535
Galicia 91 2,698,764 36.71 402
Illes Balears 240 1,198,576 40.60 199
La Rioja 62 314,487 47.71 1,274
Murcia 132 1,494,442 55.85 168
Madrid 833 6,685,471 85.73 1,086
Navarra 63 652,526 30.82 1,218
Table 1: Population density, population, percentage of population living in cities with more than 50,000
inhabitants and attack rate (total cases) of COVID-19 for the 17 Spanish regions on the first of July
ment declared the state of alarm. This directly im-
posed movement restrictions on the whole popula-
tion, allowing only essential activities and work re-
lated journeys. These restrictions where reinforced
on March 29 with the implementation of a hard-
lockdown, which suspended all mobility not related
to essential services. This lasted until the April 12,
when work trips were approved again. The first gen-
eralized de-confinement measures were adopted two
weeks later, on April 26, when kids under 14 (and a
tutor) were allowed outdoors for an hour. On May
2nd, small businesses were allowed to open through
previous appointment. This de-confinement process
continued progressively until June 21, when the last
mobility restrictions in Spain were lifted. Our anal-
ysis ends on June 27.
At administrative level 2, Spain is composed by
17 regions and two autonomous cities (Ceuta and
Melilla). The latter are not included in the analysis
because their distinct nature would require a sepa-
rate study. Even so, the 17 regions of Spain differ
significantly in socio-economic factors, as shown in
Table 1. Two regions (Catalonia and Madrid) in-
clude the largest metropolitan areas, and had the
most COVID-19 cases in absolute terms. The rest
of regions can be categorized as being dense or
sparse (as determined by the population density),
and as having their population centered on urban
areas or not (as determined by the percentage of
people living in cities with 50K or more inhabi-
tants). Cantabria and Aragon are examples of the
most uncommon cases, the first being fairly dense,
with population centered on small towns, and the
second being sparse, with population centered on
cities. Extremadura is a prototypical sparse and
rural region, while Madrid is extremely dense and
urban.
4 Analysis
In our analysis, we focus on Facebook’s remain in
tile index, and on Google’s residential index. The
former is scaled (multiplied by 50) to approximate
Google’s scale and facilitate the interpretation of
figures. We have no means to assess the relation
between the scale of both indices, which is why we
avoid interpreting the relative volume between in-
dices. Nonetheless, as we will see in Figure 1, our
scale provides a good approximation.
4.1 General Region Trend
Our first analysis is focused on the general mobil-
ity trend of Spanish regions during the peak of the
pandemic. For this, we focus on the three months
around the peak of the pandemic in Spain, as shown
in Figure 1. These are March, April and May. In
this period, mobility in Spain went through at least
4
Figure 1: Evolution of mobility according to Facebook (blue) and Google (purple) indices, from March
to May. The vertical bands (green, orange, red, orange, green) correspond to pre-confinement, state of
alarm declaration and lockdown, hard-lockdown, lockdown and de-confinement stages. Grey vertical lines
are aligned with every Sunday.
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5 clear stages (the green, orange, red, orange and
yellow bands in Figure 1):
1. March 1 - March 13 (2 weeks). A period previ-
ous to the declaration of state of alarm, when
mobility is expected to be normal. That would
mean around zero on the Google index, since
this is a measure relative to normality.
2. March 14 - March 27 (2 weeks). A period of
mobility containment after the declaration of
the state of alarm and the establishment of a
general lockdown.
3. March 28 - April 12 (2 weeks). A period of
maximum mobility containment, what we call
hard lockdown, after the government reinforced
restrictions forbidding all movements not re-
lated with essential services.
4. April 13 - May 1 (3 weeks). General lockdown
remains in place, but reinforced policies are
lifted (mobility to the workplace is allowed).
5. May 2 - June 20 (7 weeks). A period of
convergence towards new normality, as de-
confinement measures are deployed: Kids are
allowed outside for limited time, some stores
are allowed to open under certain conditions,
etc. This process is progressive, with new lifted
restrictions every 2 weeks. It goes on until June
21, when the state of alarm ended and new nor-
mality began.
First of all, let us remark the lack of significant
differences among regions with regards to the gen-
eral trend. All show the same overall behavior
through time. Mild differences exist in the degree of
confinement, and on the recovery speed during de-
confinement. Madrid for example reaches a higher
level of confinement and recovers mobility much
slower than Extremadura. The main distinctive fac-
tor of regions comes from the occurrence of periodic
peaks in the data (sometimes upwards, sometimes
downwards). We discuss those in detail on the fol-
lowing section.
According to both mobility indicators, the Span-
ish society assumed and implemented the general
lockdown in a matter of 48 hours (from March 12
to March 14). This level of mobility restrain was
sustained for seven weeks. For reference, Wuhan,
the source of the pandemic, held its lockdown for
approximately eight weeks [19]. Spain mobility was
minimized from March 15, with the declaration of
the state of alarm, to May 2, with the approval of
de-confinement measures (consecutive orange, red
and orange bands in Figure 1). After May 2, restric-
tions were gradually lifted, causing a progressive re-
covery of mobility that officially ended on June 21.
Within the seven lockdown weeks, two were under
hard-lockdown. Since restrictions were enforced by
police, mobility in this two week is a good estimate
of the maximum mobility restriction that can be
held in Spain while keeping essential services run-
ning.
To further understand the role of the hard-
lockdown, we compute an estimate of its impact on
mobility. We are interested in its effect when com-
pared to mobility under regular lockdown. The reg-
ular lockdown includes five weeks of lockdown data
(the last two of March and the last three of April)
during which traveling to industry and construction
workplaces was allowed. This sort of lockdown is as-
sumed to have a less damaging effect on the econ-
omy, but it enables infection among co-workers. To
compare mobility between both periods we measure
the corresponding area under the curve. The higher
the area, the higher the constraint. For each period,
we normalize the area by the number of weeks. The
results for all 17 regions are shown in Figure 2 as a
separate distribution for the Google and Facebook
indices. In this case, Facebook is the most inter-
esting source, since it is an absolute measure and
allows us to measure volume of people. This data
indicates an increase between 10% and 15% in the
people who stayed put. The relevance of that num-
ber for the containment of the pandemic is unknown
to us. i.e., we do not know which would have been
the evolution of the pandemic if hard-lockdown had
not been implemented. One may argue that many
Figure 2: Percentual increase in mobility reduction
during the hard-lockdown, with respect to mobility
during regular lockdown. Distribution includes the
values from all 17 Spanish regions.
6
Figure 3: Mobility containment in Madrid according to Facebook’s remain in tile and Google’s residen-
tial index, together with the number of reported cases daily in Madrid [20] shifted two weeks early to
approximate contagion date.
more people would have been infected, since regular
lockdown enables transmissions on the workplace.
However, the number of detected cases did not show
any change after hard-lockdown ended, it contin-
ued to decrease at a similar rate. One may also
argue that the hard-lockdown had a psychological
effect on society, boosting resiliency to confinement.
Looking at how mobility recovers right after hard-
lockdown is lifted, this seems to be a valid hypoth-
esis. If that were the case, a state of alarm without
hard-lockdown may have lost adherence faster.
To observe the effect and timing of the policies
implemented, we can compare it with the status of
the pandemic. For that purpose we use the number
of daily reported cases, plotting it against the mo-
bility curves. To approximate the date of the con-
tagion from the date of report, we shift this data
two weeks early. This is motivated by current es-
timates [21], which assert that the vast majority of
COVID-19 patients develop symptoms (if any) be-
fore day 14 after contagion. Figure 3 shows this
comparison, for the case of Madrid [20], the region
with the most cases and the strongest lockdown ad-
herence.
In Figure 3 we observe the beginning of the lock-
down overlapping with the initial containment of
the pandemic. That is, the number of contagions
halts its exponential trend around the date of the
state of alarm declaration. Although we do not
know the exact role of the state of alarm, it is shown
to be a clearly correlated factor. The seven weeks
of general lockdown coincide with the seven weeks
of strongest pandemic rate reduction. That is the
time it took the pandemic to reach a basal situation
in the region, with less than 100 reported cases a
day. According to this estimate, this situation may
have been reached around the starting date of the
de-confinement process. If all this was the case, the
duration of the Spanish lockdown (7 weeks) was a
very good fit to the evolution of the pandemic. A
shorter lockdown may have induced a significantly
higher risk of relapse, and a longer one seems unnec-
essary in sight of the contagion numbers estimated
to be taking place in early May. Let us remark that
during the crisis policy makers could only use cur-
rent daily cases for their decision making. That is,
without the 2 week shift we performed in Figure 3.
The de-confinement process was therefore a bolder
(and riskier) initiative than Figure 3 illustrates.
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4.2 Peaks
The general trend described in the previous section
is explained by the different stages of confinement
enforced by the Spanish government. On top of
this trend, we can see the occurrence of a num-
ber of peak values, happening periodically and on
all regions. These peaks occur mostly on Sundays
(marked with grey vertical lines in Figure 1), and
to a lesser degree on Fridays and Saturdays. Let
us discuss Sundays and Fridays in detail, since Sat-
urdays seem to be a middle ground, transitioning
between both.
Sunday peaks are anticorrelated in terms of rela-
tive mobility (Google goes down) and absolute mo-
bility (Facebook goes up). This means the number
of people moving is small when compared to near-by
days of confinement. It also means that the num-
ber of people moving is not so different from what
it used to be, when compared to the same day of
the week on normality. In other words, people were
not moving much on Sundays before the COVID-
19 crisis, and during it they were moving less. Ac-
cordingly, even though the decrease on mobility on
Sundays is not as big as on other days of the week,
it still accounts for the day of the week with less
absolute mobility. That would make Sundays the
best candidates for the mobility of risk population.
In contrast, Friday peaks exhibit a rather differ-
ent behavior. In this case, the relative mobility de-
creases sharply (Google goes up), while the absolute
mobility remains stable or decreases mildly (Face-
book goes flat or slightly up). This indicates Fridays
are the days with the most different mobility pat-
terns with respect to the previous normality (rela-
tive change), which speaks of the high mobility tak-
ing place on a normal Friday. On these days is when
society is showing its biggest change, leveling mo-
bility to the rest of the working week. That would
make Fridays the best candidates for communica-
tion and support (e.g., mental health assessment).
Let us remind the reader that these insights may
be reinforced by the bias in the data, which favours
the presence of the young segments of society.
Let us now conduct an experiment to validate
the hypothesis that peaks are related to the rela-
tive or absolute nature of measures. We transform
the Facebook measure from an absolute one to a
relative one, using as a baseline analogous remain
in tile data, from February 24 to March 8, before
the first regional restriction measures. This baseline
is computed weekday-wise, like Google’s. The re-
sult is shown in Figure 4, together with the original
Facebook data, and the Google measure. The first
obvious change are Sundays, which now peak down-
wards like Google. In fact, our relative Facebook
measure perfectly aligns with Google around week-
ends (Friday to Monday) during the whole lock-
down. This may be caused by differences in the
data (both data sources have different resolutions to
measure movement), or by differences in the base-
lines given the daily consistency.
Understanding the nature of these peaks is im-
portant because of the effect these may have on
certain metrics. As shown in Figure 5, Pearson
correlation between Facebook’s remain in tile and
Google’s residential index varies significantly from
month to month. On March, mobility exhibited
a very clear trend as a result of the establishment
of confinement measures. In this setting, the cor-
relation between both indices is clear (around 0.9
Pearson correlation on average), and the peaks are
not disruptive enough as to alter it. On the other
hand, mobility during April was stable, as the whole
month was under lockdown. This entails an overall
flat behavior of the indicators. A context in which
the inverted peaks have a dramatic effect, destroy-
ing all correlation between indices. Finally, May
appears as a middle ground. There is a generalized
mobility trend, which reduces the upsetting effect
Figure 4: Evolution of mobility according to Face-
book absolute change (blue), Facebook relative
change (green) and Google (purple). Facebook rel-
ative change has been divided by 100 to match
the scale of the other two indices. The verti-
cal bands (green, orange, red, orange, green) cor-
respond to pre-confinement, state of alarm dec-
laration and lockdown, hard-lockdown, lockdown
and de-confinement stages. Grey vertical lines are
aligned with every Sunday.
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Figure 5: Pearson correlation between Facebook’s remain in tile and Google’s residential index for different
regions and months. Facebook plotted on the horizontal axis, and Google on the vertical one.
of the peaks, but the trend is not strong enough as
to completely overpower the noise.
4.3 Daily Trend
Week days have an important role in the characteri-
zation of mobility. Let us now study the same data,
but this time from the perspective of days. To do so
we plot the Facebook and Google mobility indices as
two different axis. Figure 6 provides two visualiza-
tions for the first three months of the pandemic in
Spain. On the top row, the color gradient shows the
change through time, week by week. On the bot-
tom row, week days are color coded to illustrate the
differences between days. In these plots, horizontal
axis show absolute change (the more to the right,
the bigger number of people stay at home) while
the vertical axis shows relative change (the more
up, the more percentage of people stay at home
with respect with normal instances of that day).
The first visible thing in Figure 6 is the corre-
lation between both values, as all data is mostly
gathered around the diagonal. The top row shows
the evolution of mobility, starting from the axis
origin (bottom left) and suddenly jumping to the
top right quarter of the plot as lockdown is imple-
mented. The last Friday and Saturday before the
lockdown (second week of March) are the only days
in the middle of that jump. During confinement
(April) data is rather stable in that area, until the
de-confinement measures (May) bring it down and
left again, but this time in a slow manner.
The visualization using both Google and Face-
book as axis shows the clear correlation be-
tween them. In general, as relative mobility in-
creases/decreases, so does absolute mobility. How-
ever, this relation seems to be somewhat dependant
on the day of the week. As shown on the bottom
row of Figure 6, Sundays have a rather different be-
havior in terms of relative mobility (it shows less
affection in this metric) while Friday represents the
opposite (it shows more affection in relative mobil-
ity). This is a different visualization of the same
phenomenon observed in the peaks of Figure 1 and
discussed in §4.2.
4.4 The New Normality
On the second half of May, Spain started to lift the
confinement measures that had been in place in the
country for two months [5]. The process was asym-
metrical, with regions with better pandemic indica-
tors (i.e., number of daily cases, number of avail-
able hospital beds, etc.) de-confining faster than
others. Detailed maps of the differential treatment
of regions can be found in governmental sources [22]
This process ended on June 21, when the state of
alarm (and all mobility restrictions) was lifted. On
that date, the whole country officially entered the
new normality.
Figure 7 includes the last four weeks of state of
alarm (but without a generalized lockdown), and
the first one of new normality. To facilitate visual-
ization we change zoom in and the axis scale with
respect to Figure 6. Nonetheless, to enable com-
parison with the rest of the period under study, in
Figure 8 we plot the same data using the scale used
in Figure 6
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Figure 6: Evolution of mobility for Facebook (horizontal axis) and Google (vertical axis) data. Each dot
represents a single day in a single region. First column holds data for March, second for April and third
for May. First row shows the data with a color gradient indicating the week of the month. Second row
shows the same data colored based on day of the week.
The progression of mobility towards the axes ori-
gin is still visible and this smaller scale as weeks
go by (in color gradient), for both working days
(Monday to Friday) and weekend days (Saturday
and Sunday). To compare the new normality with
the old one, we must focus on the Google axis, since
this is relative to a baseline (January 3 to February
6). On the weekends mobility is already at Google
baseline levels, with all values between -5 and 5 on
the last week (the new normal one). In contrast,
working days are showing a higher difference with
respect to the baseline, with several values in the
last week between 5 and 15 in the Google axis. This
indicates that the change implemented by the Span-
ish society during the new normality is focused on
working days, while weekends are back to how they
were.
The recovery of old normality is not homogeneous
amount regions either. Catalonia and Madrid, the
regions with the biggest metropolitan areas, clearly
lag behind. Asturias, Navarre, La Rioja, Region of
Murcia, Extremadura and Galicia are way ahead.
Of those, only Murcia has a population density
above 100 (132 people/km2), hinting a potential re-
lation with this indicator. The lag of Catalonia and
Madrid during the first 4 weeks is likely related with
the fact that these regions were slightly behind in
the removal of restriction measures. However, dur-
ing the 5th and last week of data all regions were un-
der the same conditions, and Catalonia and Madrid
still exhibit higher levels of mobility reduction. This
may be related with the role of large metropolitan
areas, were it is harder to keep a safe distance, and
with the fact that both regions reported the high-
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Figure 7: Mobility values from Monday to Friday (left plot) and from Saturday to Sunday (right plot).
Color gradient indicates the week number (from March 25 to June 27), and the shape of the marker
indicates the region set (Crosses: Asturias, Navarre, La Rioja, Region of Murcia, Extremadura and
Galicia. Squares: Catalonia and Madrid). Grey diagonal line is the same on both plots, used for the
purpose of visual reference.
Figure 8: Mobility from March 25 to June 27, using
the same scale of Figure 6. The data of this figure
is zoomed in and split between working days and
weekend days in Figure 7.
est absolute volume of infections during the pan-
demic. Both these factors are strong psychological
enablers of self-responsibility, which may have an
effect of adherence to mobility reduction during the
new normality.
5 Conclusions
In this work we consider the use of private data
sources (Google and Facebook) for assessing the lev-
els of mobility in a country like Spain. By doing so,
we draw conclusions on two fronts. First, on the be-
havior and particularities of private data sources.
And second, on how mobility changed during the
COVID-19 pandemic in Spain.
Regarding private data sources, we have shown
the differences between using an absolute mea-
sure (like Facebook) and a relative measure (like
Google). Both of them have limitations when used
in isolation. The former lacks a contextualization of
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its values, while the latter depends entirely on the
baseline used. When used together, they provide
a visualizing of mobility where consistent patterns
can be easily identified (as presented later in this
section). For specific purposes, using a single data
source may suffice, as long as it fits the goal:
• An absolute measure like Facebook’s can be
very useful for epidemiologic purposes, as it
provides an pure measurement of mobility.
That includes estimating number of contacts
in a society, modeling the spread of the virus,
and measuring the impact of policies on abso-
lute mobility.
• A relative measure like Google’s can be very
useful for socio-economic purposes, as it pro-
vides a contextualized measurement of mobil-
ity. That includes understanding the change
caused by the new normality, and the economic
impact of mobility restriction policies.
On the second topic of this paper, the analysis of
Spanish mobility during the COVID-19 pandemic,
we extract several conclusions. On one hand, data
shows a huge mobility containment, sustained for a
month and a half (March 15 to May 1st, approxi-
mately), very close to its theoretical limit (as repre-
sented by mobility during the hard-lockdown). This
duration was sufficient to contain the spread of the
virus and bring infection numbers down to trace-
able scale. In hindsight, the policies implemented
in Spain seem appropriate and proportional to the
severity of the situation. That being said, the role,
timing and convenience of the hard-lockdown re-
mains to be further discussed. Our work shows
a relatively modest contribution of this policy to
mobility reduction. On the other hand, the hard-
lockdown may have had an effect on prolonging ad-
herence.
Our work identifies mild differences between re-
gions during the three months of restricted move-
ment. Certain regions had a stronger adherence to
confinement than others, mostly in relative terms.
This may be caused by regional differences in pre-
pandemic mobility, which is used as baseline for the
relative measurement. A similar artifact are the in-
verted peaks of weekends, where a relative measure
spikes down and an absolute measure spikes up. As
demonstrated, this the result of combining a mea-
sure relative to the weekday with an absolute mea-
sure.
We also saw significant differences among days.
Weekends exhibit the highest volume of mobility
reduction in absolute terms, even during the hard-
lockdown, when traveling to work was forbidden
for all except essential services. At the same time,
weekends have the smallest mobility reduction in
relative terms, indicating that the effort society had
to make in this regard with respect to its previous
patterns was smaller. Fridays and Sundays are par-
ticularly relevant days, the first because it repre-
sents the biggest change from normal behavior, the
second because it represents the biggest absolute
decrease in mobility. These particularities could be
exploited for the general good.
Finally, we analyzed the new normality by look-
ing at the weeks of de-confinement, up until June
27, a week after the state of alarm was lifted on the
whole of Spain. In this period, we found Saturdays
and Sundays to be already at pre-pandemic levels
of mobility. In contrast, working days (Monday to
Friday) still show significant differences. The new
normality also shows differences between regions,
particularly for working days. Regions with large
metropolitan areas exhibit a reduction in mobility
between 4% and 14% after restrictions were lifted.
Indeed, the new normality is most new on urban
working days.
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